The Chinese leadership is discovering that financialmarkets have a tendency to punish governmentsfor doing the right thing at the wrong time. And it is not the only one dealing with therepercussions. The consequences are being felt around the world.

中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層正在發(fā)現(xiàn)，金融市場往往會懲罰在錯(cuò)誤時(shí)間做正確事情的政府。而中國并非唯一一個(gè)受其影響的國家。全世界都感受到了后果。

Just a few weeks ago, Beijing moved to make its exchange rate setting mechanism moreflexible. This decision — which had been advocated to Chinese officials for years byeconomists and US governments — is an important step in the country’s multi-decade journeytowards a truly market-based system. And, as such a large economy on the global stage, it isconsistent with the country gradually assuming more of its multilateral economic governanceresponsibilities.

就在幾周前，中國政府采取行動(dòng)以使其匯率形成機(jī)制變得更加靈活。這一決定(經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們以及美國政府多年來一直主張中國官員這樣做)是中國數(shù)十年來走向真正市場化機(jī)制進(jìn)程中的重要一步。而且，作為全球舞臺上如此巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，中國這樣做與逐步承擔(dān)更多的多邊經(jīng)濟(jì)治理責(zé)任相一致。

From many dimensions, this was a good policy step. The problem is that it was implemented atthe wrong time.

從許多方面來說，這是一項(xiàng)不錯(cuò)的政策措施。但問題在于它是在錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)間實(shí)施的。

Delayed and then announced in the context of mounting evidence that China is in the midstof a significant economic slowdown, it resulted in an immediate depreciation of the renminbi. Assuch, rather than being viewed as an important part of beneficial medium-term economicreform, it was deemed by many as China’s attempt to “steal growth from other countries —thereby contributing to global financial instability as markets rushed to price in theprobability of a larger deceleration of the global economy.

之前一直拖延、而后又在越來越多的證據(jù)表明中國經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于顯著放緩時(shí)宣布這一決定，其結(jié)果是人民幣隨即貶值。如此一來，這一舉措不但未被看作是有益的中期經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的重要部分，還被許多人視為中國試圖從其他國家“竊取增長——從而導(dǎo)致了全球金融不穩(wěn)定，因?yàn)槭袌黾庇谠趦r(jià)格中反映全球經(jīng)濟(jì)更大范圍減速的可能性。

It only took a few days for disruptive markets to force the government to intervene in theforeign exchange market, rather than be less involved. As the global financial disorderpersisted, it then felt obliged to supplement this with a series of monetary stimulusmeasures, including an interest-rate cut, lower reserve requirement and direct liquidityinjections.

混亂的市場只用了幾天時(shí)間就迫使中國政府干預(yù)外匯市場(而非更少地介入)。隨著全球金融混亂持續(xù)不斷，中國政府還感到有必要輔以一系列貨幣刺激措施——包括降息、降準(zhǔn)以及直接注入流動(dòng)性。

There is a risk that a similar phenomenon could play out following reports that the governmentmay pare down its involvement in the stock market.

中國政府可能會減少干預(yù)股市的報(bào)道出現(xiàn)后，類似的一幕有可能還會上演。

Recognising that it cannot (and should not) be in the business of supporting overvalued stocks,there are reports that Beijing is considering moving away from its policy of large-scale marketpurchases. This is the right thing to do. But, once again, if the government is not careful, astep consistent with medium-term reform could well come at the wrong time; and, this timearound, it is regrettably accompanied by the shaming of those raising doubts about currentmarket valuations.

有報(bào)道稱，在認(rèn)識到自身無法(也不應(yīng)該)支撐估值過高的股價(jià)之后，中國政府正在考慮退出大規(guī)模購股政策。這是正確的做法。但是，如果中國政府不謹(jǐn)慎行事的話，一項(xiàng)與中期改革一致的措施很有可能再次出現(xiàn)在錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)間;而遺憾的是，這次還要伴隨著那些對當(dāng)前股市估值提出質(zhì)疑人士的羞辱。

Markets in China and elsewhere are still in the process of trying to regain their footing after aweek of unprecedented volatility. In such circumstances, market-savvy policymakers wouldallow the dust to settle further before doing something that could destabilise still-anxiousinvestor sentiment.

經(jīng)過一周空前的震蕩后，中國及其他地區(qū)的股市仍處于努力重新站穩(wěn)腳跟的階段。在這種情況下，洞悉市場的政策制定者在采取一些可能讓仍然焦慮的投資者情緒更加不穩(wěn)定的措施前，應(yīng)該繼續(xù)等待塵埃落定。

This phenomenon, of taking the right policy step at the wrong time from a marketsperspective, is not limited to China. The US Federal Reserve has experienced it several times,including when it triggered a “taper tantrum in May-June 2023: the sudden announcementthat it intended to ease — or taper — monetary stimulus that threw global markets in a dizzyfor a few weeks, and that forced the Fed to talk back its statement.

這種現(xiàn)象——從市場的角度看，在錯(cuò)誤時(shí)間采取正確的政策措施——并不只發(fā)生在中國。美聯(lián)儲(Fed)已經(jīng)歷過多次，包括在2023年5月至6月間引發(fā)的一場“縮減恐慌(taper tantrum)：美聯(lián)儲突然宣布打算放緩(或縮減)貨幣刺激，引發(fā)全球市場幾個(gè)周的動(dòng)蕩，并迫使美聯(lián)儲收回了自己的聲明。

As it engages further on the road of economic liberalisation and broader market-based reforms,China will learn something that other countries have done so painfully, be it elsewhere in theemerging world (Brazil or South Korea, for example) or in the advanced world. It has nochoice but to be a lot more sensitive to short-term market positioning, including the potentialfor sudden portfolio reversals that then risk spilling back on to the real economy andundermining the effectiveness of policies.

隨著在經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化和更廣泛市場化改革的道路上進(jìn)一步深入，中國將學(xué)到一些其他國家——無論是其他新興市場國家(如巴西和韓國)還是發(fā)達(dá)國家——已有過的慘痛教訓(xùn)。中國別無選擇，只能對短期市場資源配置更加敏感，包括投資組合突然反轉(zhuǎn)、隨后風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)并削弱政策有效性的可能性。

Such sensitivity will need to be accompanied by much better communication, as well as moresophisticated management of market expectations (and this does not include the intimidationof sellers and the public shaming of financial journalists). Otherwise, the credibility of theChinese government itself, including its history of admirable policymaking and vision, would berepeatedly tested by disgruntled and unstable financial markets; and, were this to materialise,the repercussions would inevitably be felt by financial markets in the rest of the world.

這樣的敏感需要伴隨更好的溝通，以及更成熟的市場預(yù)期管理(而這不包括對賣方的恐嚇以及對財(cái)經(jīng)記者的公開羞辱)。否則，中國政府自身的公信力——包括其令人欽佩的決策和愿景構(gòu)想歷史——將受到滿腹牢騷的不穩(wěn)定金融市場的反復(fù)考驗(yàn);而如果真是這樣的話，影響將不可避免地波及到世界其他地區(qū)的金融市場。

Mohamed is chief economic adviser to Allianz, chairman of President Barack Obama’s GlobalDevelopment Council, and author of When Markets Collide

本文作者是安聯(lián)集團(tuán)(Allianz)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問，并擔(dān)任美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克攠巴馬(Barack Obama)的全球發(fā)展委員會(Global Development Council)的主席，并著有《當(dāng)市場發(fā)生沖撞》(When Markets Collide)一書。

The Chinese leadership is discovering that financialmarkets have a tendency to punish governmentsfor doing the right thing at the wrong time. And it is not the only one dealing with therepercussions. The consequences are being felt around the world.

中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層正在發(fā)現(xiàn)，金融市場往往會懲罰在錯(cuò)誤時(shí)間做正確事情的政府。而中國并非唯一一個(gè)受其影響的國家。全世界都感受到了后果。

Just a few weeks ago, Beijing moved to make its exchange rate setting mechanism moreflexible. This decision — which had been advocated to Chinese officials for years byeconomists and US governments — is an important step in the country’s multi-decade journeytowards a truly market-based system. And, as such a large economy on the global stage, it isconsistent with the country gradually assuming more of its multilateral economic governanceresponsibilities.

就在幾周前，中國政府采取行動(dòng)以使其匯率形成機(jī)制變得更加靈活。這一決定(經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家們以及美國政府多年來一直主張中國官員這樣做)是中國數(shù)十年來走向真正市場化機(jī)制進(jìn)程中的重要一步。而且，作為全球舞臺上如此巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體，中國這樣做與逐步承擔(dān)更多的多邊經(jīng)濟(jì)治理責(zé)任相一致。

From many dimensions, this was a good policy step. The problem is that it was implemented atthe wrong time.

從許多方面來說，這是一項(xiàng)不錯(cuò)的政策措施。但問題在于它是在錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)間實(shí)施的。

Delayed and then announced in the context of mounting evidence that China is in the midstof a significant economic slowdown, it resulted in an immediate depreciation of the renminbi. Assuch, rather than being viewed as an important part of beneficial medium-term economicreform, it was deemed by many as China’s attempt to “steal growth from other countries —thereby contributing to global financial instability as markets rushed to price in theprobability of a larger deceleration of the global economy.

之前一直拖延、而后又在越來越多的證據(jù)表明中國經(jīng)濟(jì)正處于顯著放緩時(shí)宣布這一決定，其結(jié)果是人民幣隨即貶值。如此一來，這一舉措不但未被看作是有益的中期經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的重要部分，還被許多人視為中國試圖從其他國家“竊取增長——從而導(dǎo)致了全球金融不穩(wěn)定，因?yàn)槭袌黾庇谠趦r(jià)格中反映全球經(jīng)濟(jì)更大范圍減速的可能性。

It only took a few days for disruptive markets to force the government to intervene in theforeign exchange market, rather than be less involved. As the global financial disorderpersisted, it then felt obliged to supplement this with a series of monetary stimulusmeasures, including an interest-rate cut, lower reserve requirement and direct liquidityinjections.

混亂的市場只用了幾天時(shí)間就迫使中國政府干預(yù)外匯市場(而非更少地介入)。隨著全球金融混亂持續(xù)不斷，中國政府還感到有必要輔以一系列貨幣刺激措施——包括降息、降準(zhǔn)以及直接注入流動(dòng)性。

There is a risk that a similar phenomenon could play out following reports that the governmentmay pare down its involvement in the stock market.

中國政府可能會減少干預(yù)股市的報(bào)道出現(xiàn)后，類似的一幕有可能還會上演。

Recognising that it cannot (and should not) be in the business of supporting overvalued stocks,there are reports that Beijing is considering moving away from its policy of large-scale marketpurchases. This is the right thing to do. But, once again, if the government is not careful, astep consistent with medium-term reform could well come at the wrong time; and, this timearound, it is regrettably accompanied by the shaming of those raising doubts about currentmarket valuations.

有報(bào)道稱，在認(rèn)識到自身無法(也不應(yīng)該)支撐估值過高的股價(jià)之后，中國政府正在考慮退出大規(guī)模購股政策。這是正確的做法。但是，如果中國政府不謹(jǐn)慎行事的話，一項(xiàng)與中期改革一致的措施很有可能再次出現(xiàn)在錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)間;而遺憾的是，這次還要伴隨著那些對當(dāng)前股市估值提出質(zhì)疑人士的羞辱。

Markets in China and elsewhere are still in the process of trying to regain their footing after aweek of unprecedented volatility. In such circumstances, market-savvy policymakers wouldallow the dust to settle further before doing something that could destabilise still-anxiousinvestor sentiment.

經(jīng)過一周空前的震蕩后，中國及其他地區(qū)的股市仍處于努力重新站穩(wěn)腳跟的階段。在這種情況下，洞悉市場的政策制定者在采取一些可能讓仍然焦慮的投資者情緒更加不穩(wěn)定的措施前，應(yīng)該繼續(xù)等待塵埃落定。

This phenomenon, of taking the right policy step at the wrong time from a marketsperspective, is not limited to China. The US Federal Reserve has experienced it several times,including when it triggered a “taper tantrum in May-June 2023: the sudden announcementthat it intended to ease — or taper — monetary stimulus that threw global markets in a dizzyfor a few weeks, and that forced the Fed to talk back its statement.

這種現(xiàn)象——從市場的角度看，在錯(cuò)誤時(shí)間采取正確的政策措施——并不只發(fā)生在中國。美聯(lián)儲(Fed)已經(jīng)歷過多次，包括在2023年5月至6月間引發(fā)的一場“縮減恐慌(taper tantrum)：美聯(lián)儲突然宣布打算放緩(或縮減)貨幣刺激，引發(fā)全球市場幾個(gè)周的動(dòng)蕩，并迫使美聯(lián)儲收回了自己的聲明。

As it engages further on the road of economic liberalisation and broader market-based reforms,China will learn something that other countries have done so painfully, be it elsewhere in theemerging world (Brazil or South Korea, for example) or in the advanced world. It has nochoice but to be a lot more sensitive to short-term market positioning, including the potentialfor sudden portfolio reversals that then risk spilling back on to the real economy andundermining the effectiveness of policies.

隨著在經(jīng)濟(jì)自由化和更廣泛市場化改革的道路上進(jìn)一步深入，中國將學(xué)到一些其他國家——無論是其他新興市場國家(如巴西和韓國)還是發(fā)達(dá)國家——已有過的慘痛教訓(xùn)。中國別無選擇，只能對短期市場資源配置更加敏感，包括投資組合突然反轉(zhuǎn)、隨后風(fēng)險(xiǎn)蔓延至實(shí)體經(jīng)濟(jì)并削弱政策有效性的可能性。

Such sensitivity will need to be accompanied by much better communication, as well as moresophisticated management of market expectations (and this does not include the intimidationof sellers and the public shaming of financial journalists). Otherwise, the credibility of theChinese government itself, including its history of admirable policymaking and vision, would berepeatedly tested by disgruntled and unstable financial markets; and, were this to materialise,the repercussions would inevitably be felt by financial markets in the rest of the world.

這樣的敏感需要伴隨更好的溝通，以及更成熟的市場預(yù)期管理(而這不包括對賣方的恐嚇以及對財(cái)經(jīng)記者的公開羞辱)。否則，中國政府自身的公信力——包括其令人欽佩的決策和愿景構(gòu)想歷史——將受到滿腹牢騷的不穩(wěn)定金融市場的反復(fù)考驗(yàn);而如果真是這樣的話，影響將不可避免地波及到世界其他地區(qū)的金融市場。

Mohamed is chief economic adviser to Allianz, chairman of President Barack Obama’s GlobalDevelopment Council, and author of When Markets Collide

本文作者是安聯(lián)集團(tuán)(Allianz)首席經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問，并擔(dān)任美國總統(tǒng)巴拉克攠巴馬(Barack Obama)的全球發(fā)展委員會(Global Development Council)的主席，并著有《當(dāng)市場發(fā)生沖撞》(When Markets Collide)一書。