Separated by Civilization: Trans-Atlantic Impasse (1)

The war in Iraq has made the Atlantic seem wider. But really it has had the effect of a magnifying glass, bringing older and more fundamental differences between Europe and the United States into focus. (2)

These growing divisions? over war, peace, religion, sex, life and death? amount to a philosophical dispute about the common origins of European and American civilization. Both children of the Enlightenment, the United States and Europe clearly differ about the nature of this inheritance and about who is its better custodian. (3)

Start with religion. The United States is experiencing a revival of the Christian faith in many areas of civic and political life, while in Europe the process of secularization continues unabated. (4)Today the United States is the most religious-minded society of the Western democracies. In a 2003 Harris poll (5) 79 percent of Americans said they believed in God, and more than a third said they attended a religious service once a month or more. Numerous polls have shown that these figures are much lower in Western Europe. In the United States a majority of respondents in recent years told pollsters that they believed in angels, while in Europe the issue was apparently considered so preposterous (6) that no one even asked the question.

Terms that President George W. Bush has used, like "crusade" and "axis of evil," and Manichaean exclusions like his observation that anyone who is not on our side is on the side of the terrorists, reveal the assumption of a religious mantle by a secular power, which in Europe has become unthinkable. (7) Was it not, perhaps, this same sense of religious infallibility that seduced senior members of the Bush administration into leading their country into a war with Iraq on the basis of information that has turned out to be false? (8)

Another reason for Europe's alienation from the United States is harder to define, but for want of a better term, I call it American narcissism (9).

When American troops in Iraq mistakenly shoot an Arab journalist or reduce half of a village to rubble in response to the explosion of a roadside bomb, there will inevitably be a backlash (10). Only a fool would maintain that an occupying power could afford many such mistakes, even if it is under constant threat of suicide attacks. The success of an occupation policy — however temporary it is meant to be — depends on the occupier's ability to convince the population, by means of symbolic and material gestures, that it is prepared to admit to mistakes.

In its use of the language of power the Bush administration has created the opposite impression, and not just in Iraq. The United States apparently cannot be wrong about anything, nor does it have to apologize to anybody. In many parts of the world people have come to believe, fairly or not, that Americans regard the life of their countrymen as infinitely more valuable than the lives of any other of the earth's inhabitants.

Of course, even in Europe only a pacifist minority denies the existence of necessary, unavoidable, justified wars. (11) The interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan (12) were supported by many European nations, even if some took a long time to make up their minds. European soldiers took part in those wars and continue to play a part in the peacekeeping aftermath (13).

What arouses European suspicion, though, is the doctrine of just, preemptive wars Bush has outlined. Anyone who claims to be waging a preventive war in the cause of justice is confusing either a particular or a partisan interest with the interests of humanity. A president who makes such a claim would be arrogating the right to be the ultimate arbiter of war and peace and to stand in judgment over the world. (14) From there it is but a short step to dismissing a basic insight of the Enlightenment, namely that human judgment and decisions are fallible by their very nature. This fallibility cannot be annulled or ameliorated by any political, legal or religious authority. The same argument goes for the death penalty. (15)

Animosity (16) isn't the only feature of the trans-Atlantic relationship. Europe is rightly envious of America's multicultural society. There can be no doubt that the United States has produced the World's most varied and integrative culture, and it is no accident that it is the only one to have a worldwide appeal.

But the American multicultural model also generates an illusion. Since Americans really have come from all over the world, in the United States it is easy to believe that you can know and understand the world without ever leaving the country. Those who were born and brought up in America forget that these people "from all over the world" first had to become Americans? a condition that new immigrants generally accept with enthusiasm? before they could celebrate their cultural otherness. (17)

The impressive integrative power of American society seems to generate a kind of obliviousness to the world, a multicultural unilateralism. (18) The result is a paradox: a fantastically tolerant and flexible society that has absorbed the whole world, yet has difficulty comprehending the world beyond its borders.

These differences and irritations add up to a substantial disagreement on the joint origins of American and European civilization. Europeans think that Americans are on their way to betraying some of the elementary tenets of the Enlightenment, establishing a new principle in which they are "first among unequals." (19)

And Washington accuses Europe of shirking its international responsibilities, and thus its own human rights inheritance.

Unfortunately, we cannot expect the news media in the United States or Europe to present a nuanced20 views of this dispute. In (20) years of traveling back and forth between Germany and America I have become convinced that news broadcasts usually confirm their audiences' views: in Europe, about America, the "cowboy nation," and in the United States, about Europe, the "axis of weasels (21)."

These disagreements will be influenced but cannot be resolved by the American presidential election in November. The divisions are too deep, and Europe cannot meet the United States halfway on too many issues? the separation between church and state, the separation of powers, respect for international law, the abolition of the death penalty--without surrendering its version of its Enlightenment inheritance (22).

On other contentious issues the United States feels as strongly: the universality of human rights and the need to intervene -- if the United Nations is unable to act -- when there is genocide or ethnic cleansing, or when states are failing. (23)

So are we standing on the threshold of a new understanding or a new historic divide, comparable to the evolutionary split that occurred when a group of pioneer hominids thousands of years ago turned their backs forever on their African homeland? (24)

So far it has usually been the Americans who have had to remind the Europeans of these common origins, which the Europeans, in turn, have so often betrayed. Maybe this time it is up to the Europeans to remind the Americans of the promises of the Enlightenment that the Unite States seems to have forgotten.

(1). impasse：僵局。

(2). 但實際上這場戰爭具有放大鏡的效果，讓歐洲和美國之間由來已久的、更為根本的區別凸顯出來。

(3). 美國和歐洲均為啟蒙運動的后代，但它們對這份遺產的性質以及誰才是其最佳繼承人的看法顯然不同。child：后代/深受某種影響的人;the Enlightenment：啟蒙運動，指18世紀歐洲以推崇“理性”、懷疑教會權威和封建制度為特點的文化思想運動;custodian：原意是“保管人”，這里指遺產的繼承人。

(4). secularization：世俗化;unabated：不減弱的，不衰退的。

(5). Harris Poll：哈里斯民意測驗，在美國很有權威性。

(6). preposterous：荒謬的，愚蠢的。

(7). 布什總統使用著“十字軍東征”、“邪惡軸心”之類的詞兒，奉行不在我們這邊，就在恐怖主義那邊的排他主義，這都反映了一個世俗政權繼承了宗教衣缽的架勢，而這種架勢在歐洲是不可思議的。manichaean/;m*n!#ki:2n/：二元論者的，非此即彼的;mantle：(作為權力標志的)衣缽。

(8). infallibility：絕對可靠性,下文中的fallibility則指“不可靠性”;seduce：引誘。

(9). narcissism：自我陶醉，自戀。

(10). backlash：強烈反應。

(11). 當然，甚至在歐洲也只有少數的和平主義者否認存在著必要的、難以避免的正義戰爭。pacifist：和平主義者，反戰主義者。

(12). Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan：波斯尼亞、科索沃、阿富汗，1995年、1999年和2001年，以美國為首的北約曾對這三個地區或國家進行軍事干預或占領。

(13). aftermath：指戰爭結束后的一個時期。

(14). 而引起歐洲疑慮的是布什提出的先發制人的正義戰爭理論。任何人宣稱自己是以正義的名義發動一場預防性戰爭都是在混淆個人或黨派的利益與整個人類的利益。作此言論的總統都是僭取了對戰爭與和平的最終仲裁權，并操縱對整個世界的裁判。preemptive：先發制人的;partisan：黨派的;arrogate：僭取;arbiter：裁決人，決定者。

(15). 這種犯錯誤的必然性并不會因為任何政治、法律或宗教的權力而消除或得到改善。這一論斷同樣適用于死刑(多年來，美國的死刑制度一直受到來自歐洲的壓力，歐洲委員會每年都以報告的形式呼吁美國廢除死刑——編者注)。annul/2#n7l/：廢除，取消;ameliorate：改良，改善。

(16). animosity：(尤指表現于行動的)仇恨，敵意。

(17). 那些在美國出生并長大的人忘了這些“來自全世界”的人們首先必須變成美國人(新移民通常積極熱情地接受此條件)，然后才能慶祝他們自己的文化相異性。otherness：另一性，不同性。

(18). obliviousness：忽視;multicultural unilateralism：多元文化的單邊主義。

(19). tenet/#ti:net/：信條，宗旨;“first among unequals”：“在不平等人群里的上等人”，這是對美國人信仰里的“人生而平等”的極大諷刺。

(20). nuanced/#nj u:#4:nst/：細致入微的。

(21). “鼬鼠軸心”，這是美國媒體給反對美國出兵伊拉克的法、德兩國冠以的稱號。鼬鼠在美俚中是“推諉責任的人、小人”之意。

(22).如果不放棄其(指歐洲)關于啟蒙運動遺產的看法。

(23). 在其他有爭議的問題上美國同樣毫不退讓：人權的普遍性，以及——當出現種族滅絕和清洗行為或國家搖搖欲墜之時——干預的必要性(如果聯合國無法采取行動的話)。contentious：引起爭議的。

(24). 因此，我們是否站在了一個新的理解或一個新的歷史性的分界線的門檻上，而其意義可與千萬年前一批類人猿的先驅永遠地告別了他們的非洲故土、開始向人類進化相媲美?hominid：人科的動物。

閱讀感評

我們常說“東西方文明”或“中西文化”，似乎包括歐美及其他一些具有“猶太—基督教傳統”的國家的“西方”是一個整體(按當前學界時髦的提法是“共同體”)，鐵板一塊，難以撼動。然而事實是，現在中外各種媒體卻時時在提醒我們：歐洲與美國正在分道揚鑣。據說這發端于1989年的冷戰結束，在巴爾干半島危機和“9?11”恐怖襲擊后進一步表面化，而到了美國入侵伊拉克后，“大西洋就顯得更加寬廣無邊了”。

記得我去年參加“世界啟蒙大會”時，注意到有一個議題是“跨大西洋的啟蒙：舊世界的遺產和新世界的觀念”(the Trans-atlantic Enlightenment：Old World Legacies and New World Ideas)。不可否認，歐洲的遺產和美洲的觀念必然會有淵源關系;但是，一個大西洋的距離以及當時歐洲與新大陸之間自然、社會條件的迥異，“啟蒙”在那片蠻荒之地是足以變化出讓當事人都吃驚的變體的，更不用提到了兩、三個世紀之后的今天了。就在那次大會上，甚至還有學者組織了一個研討會，“Is there a European Culture?” 在他們看來，不用說“西方”，即使是“歐洲”諸國也是各說各的話，差異很明顯。

當然，學者在研討會上的討論也不能全信，因為當今的學術有時為了邏輯性常常會把問題簡單化，而且為了提出一種獨特的理論或觀點往往還會走極端。由此看來，在歐美之間穿梭來回的這位德國作家Peter Schneider的看法可能會更中肯些。

他認為，雖然歐洲和美國均為“啟蒙運動”的后代，但它們對于這筆遺產的性質以及誰是最佳繼承人各執一詞。它們在戰爭與和平、宗教、性、生與死方面觀點相悖，而且越走越遠。接著，作者在屬于當前熱點的幾大方面對美國和歐洲各自的觀點進行對比：在宗教上，美國的基督教信仰正在復興，而歐洲卻越來越世俗化。由此引申，以布什為首的美國人比較熱衷“二元對立”，將自己的事業看作“十字軍東征”，而反對他的任何人均屬“邪惡軸心”，歐洲人對此覺得有些不可思議。第二個方面是作者所謂的“美國式的孤芳自賞”，即美國人認為自己不會犯錯誤，而且認為美國人的生命要比地球上其他人的生命珍貴得多，因此他們從不認錯或道歉，而且一旦受到攻擊，便會瘋狂地報復;美國宣揚“先發制人”的戰爭的合理合法性，而歐洲人質疑美國人的動機，認為這很容易把一己的利益與整個人類的利益相混淆，導致美國總統自封為世界戰爭與和平的最后仲裁者這樣的后果。說到底，歐洲人對此持不同看法的理由是人人都難免犯錯誤，沒有什么永遠正確的“神”或“權威”，其實這正是“啟蒙思想”的一個核心原則。在美國人所謂的“多元文化”上，作者坦言美國創造了世界上最多樣、最有凝聚力的文化，而且是唯一的一個具有世界性魅力的文化。然而，作者也清醒地認識到，美國的多元文化是有條件的，即你要先承認美國的價值觀，也就是說，美國人對“他者”容忍的前提是你首先要“崇美”，否則就要以所謂的“un-Americanness”予以調查甚至剝奪你的自由，如20世紀50年代的麥卡錫主義直至前幾年對美籍華人科學家李文和的間諜指控以及近年來對在美阿拉伯人的防范與歧視等等都是佐證。最后，在美國愈演愈烈的單邊主義問題上，歐洲人認為應該在國際關系中提倡談判協商與妥協，而美國人認為人權是普遍性的，干預是必須的?？傊?，歐美相互指責，美國人說歐洲人逃避責任，是“axis of weasels”;而歐洲人卻說美國人背離了啟蒙思想的理念，是“cowboy nation”。(牛仔會引起以下聯想：reckless，arrogant，oblivious to the world。)

文明如同文化，是個相當大的話題，我們不妨給它分分類，如政治文明、經濟文明、日常生活文明、文學藝術文明，等等。顯然，以上涉及的歐洲與美國(其實主要是美國與所謂“舊歐洲”的代表——法國與德國)的分歧屬于政治文明的范疇，而在這個范疇里，“西方”作為一個整體確實顯示了分崩離析的跡象。美國人現在大多采取攻勢，而歐洲則處于守勢。但是，文明在這里到底扮演了多重要的角色呢?

眾所周知，面對一場政治沖突時，人們可能采取的對策不外乎三種：談判解決、動用武力、接受失敗。美國與歐洲在處理國際政治問題時的分歧可以簡單地用以下的“兩分法”來展示：Power vs. Weakness, Armed Intervention vs. Negotiation, Unilateral Action vs. Multilateral Consultation，而這些分歧其實與西方的文明傳統并沒有太直接的關系，直接有關的是美國與歐洲目前所面臨的“形勢”，換句話說，是“形勢”或許還有因此而來的對“利益”的考慮才迫使他們做出抉擇。美國在冷戰后完全可以憑借其強大的軍事和經濟實力，按“叢林原則”一意孤行而絕少有較大的風險，而歐洲就不一樣了。二戰以后，德、英、法各國均不同程度地受到削弱，他們不可能完全憑自己的力量稱霸，因此類似“歐盟”這樣的“妥協產物”就成了他們主要追求的目標，這與二戰前顯著不同。文明通?！盁o國界”，具有穩定性;政治則往往局限在一個國家里面，反復無常。所以，我在此要借用文明的聲音為文明申冤：近年來我受夠了“替罪羊”、“出氣筒”的角色，我是無辜的!

這里有兩個悖論很有趣，不妨特別提出來讓大家看個明白。一是原文提到的崇尚“多元化”、“全球化”的美國，卻對外部世界的聲音置若罔聞，執行單邊主義;美國社會崇尚容忍與靈活性，但對國界之外的“不同社會”的態度和政策均僵化。二是美國總統口口聲聲說自己的國家是“democracy”，偏偏就是他對聯合國安理會的“democratic decision”毫不理會，甚至稱后者“irrelevant”。美國人號稱自己是解放者(liberator)，給伊拉克人送去民主，但在聯合國的舞臺上他們就顯得很不民主。難怪有學者說，美國人的這個做法致使人類社會倒退了至少一個時代!

2003年，美國學者Robert Kagan在其著作Of Paradise and Power：America and Europe in the New World Order里宣稱，美國是世界上最“modern”的國家，而歐洲國家是最“postmodern(后現代的)”的，但他并未做進一步闡釋。也許在他看來，modern即意味著強大并崇尚武力，而postmodern意味著拒絕使用武力吧。最早提出后現代理論、并有著為數最多的后現代理論家和文學作品的美國卻把這個the most postmodern nation的桂冠拱手獻出或拒絕接受，這大概也算是個不大不小的悖論吧。